This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income inequality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time preferences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also o¤ers an alternative explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation between time preference and labor income. Under some speci…c distributions regarding wage o¤ers and time preferences, we show how the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income distribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the parameters of the model.
Introduction
Departing from an exogenous distribution of wages faced by a prospective worker, job-search models generate several di¤erent derived probability distributions of possible interest for the study of income inequality. This fact, This work has been prepared during my 2004 visit to the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago. I am thankful to the Department for its hospitality and and to Professor Robert Lucas Jr. for the sponsorship of my visit.
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z Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics (EPGE/FGV). 1 though, except maybe for the seminal work of Pissarides's (1974) , has not been explored enough in the income-distribution literature. First, there is the distribution obtained from the original distribution of wage o¤ers by truncation, in which all mass allocated to wages between zero and the reservation wage is placed at zero. Pissarides's use of a job-search model to investigate income inequality, for instance, is wholly based on the range of nonzero incomes of this truncated distribution.
Second, there is the invariant distribution which characterizes the longrun behavior of the state of the system. And, third, the derived distribution of long-run average wages (calculated under the stationary convergent measure) when ex-ante heterogenous workers are grouped into di¤erent cohorts 1 of homogenous workers.
In contrast with Pissaride's analysis, our approach is based on the two Markovian long-run distributions last mentioned. Another important conceptual di¤erence between our approach and Pissarides's is that, while this author contemplates solely within-cohort inequality, comparing inequality in two societies with di¤erent degrees of risk aversion, we investigate both within-cohort inequality and between-cohort inequality.
In our work, between-group inequality is a consequence of the heterogeneity of time preferences among workers. More impatient workers tend to accept wage o¤ers that less impatient workers possibly would not. The theoretical conjecture driving our investigation, regarding this issue, is that by these means cohorts with more impatient workers end up with lower average wages in a (Markovian) long-run equilibrium, thereby creating betweencohort inequality.
Within cohort-inequality, in turn, is generated by the constant turn over in the job market. At any speci…c point of time, any cross sectional measurement of incomes in an economy, provided by empirical research, necessarily incorporates the fact that some workers have just been unemployed, others are searching, and others are employed within a certain range of wages. This is the inequality to which we refer as within-cohort inequality. Evaluating it at the stationary distribution amounts to assuming that the economy is in its long-run steady state when incomes are recorded.
It is not a purpose of the paper to provide an explanation of the causes of income inequality between individuals in di¤erent countries or regions. Our main objective, complementing Pissarides's seminal work, is exploring the use of a job-search model in the investigation of income inequality, in particular, by analyzing how the within-cohort and between-cohort inequalities respond to the exogenous parameters of the model 2 . As a measure of inequality, we shall use only the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution, and its associated Lorenz curve. It is useful having some idea of the usual empirical values of this statistic. The 75-country sample presented by Bulir (2001) shows that the Gini usually varies between around 0.2 (Czechoslovakia 0.195, Finland 0.202 and Sweden 0.229) and around 0.6 (Brazil leads with 0.633, followed by Gabon, 0.630). Latin America has been one of the regions of the world with the greatest inequality. Ferranti et alli (2004) report Gini coe¢ cients in the 1990s averaging 0.522 in Latin America, against the much smaller …gures of 0.342, 0.328 and 0.412, for the OECD, Eastern Europe, and Asia, respectively.
Besides the investigation of the topic of income inequality, the results we derive here can also be used to provide an alternative explanation for the negative correlation between income and time-preference parameters. Lawrance (1991) estimated consumption Euler equations using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and showed that subjective rates of time preferences can be up to 6 percent higher in the top 5 percent of the income distribution than in the bottom …fth percentile. Two possible explanations of such a pattern have been o¤ered by this author. First, credit constraints (in which case …nancing the smoothing of consumption during a training period would not be feasible, leading more impatient consumers to lower investments in human capital); and, second, the existence of socioeconomic variables which, following this author, would lead both to time impatience and to a low level of labor income.
Our alternative explanation for Lawrance's empirical …ndings is that more impatient workers tend to accept lower wage o¤ers and end up with lower average wages. Propositions 1 and 3 of this paper show that such a conjecture is valid under general conditions.
The Model Without Layo¤s
Our theoretical analysis has as exogenous degrees of freedom the distribution of wage o¤ers taken by the workers, the distribution of the time-preference parameter among workers, the probability of layo¤s in each period and the average time of compulsory unemployment till another wage o¤er can be drawn. This last variable can also be interpreted as a required period of retraining. In the present section we do not consider the probability of layo¤s. This is done later in the paper.
In the measurable space [0; 1); B [0;1) ; L ; B [0;1) ; standing for the borelians in [0; 1) and L for the Lebesgue measure in this space, consider a continuum of cohorts of workers. Each cohort j is composed of large number of workers with a (one-period) time preference parameter given by j 2 [0; 1); where
In equation (1), j has a uniform distribution in [0; 1) and H stands for the inverse function of a cumulative probability distribution of a random variable taking values in [0; 1); with H 0 (:) > 0 in all of its domain: The isomorphism (1) allows us to put di¤erent probability measures m in the space where the time-preference parameters take value (also ([0; 1); B [0;1) )). For instance, if H is the cumulative distribution function of a Beta (s; v) random variable, then j will be distributed as a Beta (s; v). Note that having H 0 (:) > 0 allows us to identify each cohort j with its time preference parameter j :
In this paper we will endow the space where time preferences take values with two particular distributions: a uniform distribution in [z; 1); 0 < z < 1 and a Beta (s; v) distribution. By varying s and v one can generate di¤er-ent measures regarding the time preference parameters. In the case of the uniform distribution in [z; 1) the inverse transformation (1) is easily given by:
For 0 < D < 1; consider also the second measurable space ; B [0;D] ; p and, in this space, the measure q induced by the wage function w:
; q ; we denote by F (t) the distribution function that (q a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q : F (t) = p(w t):
Our analysis of the basic decision problem for each worker in each cohort follows, without signi…cant changes, Stokey and Lucas's (1989) version of McCall's (1970) model of intertemporal job search. A minor modi…cation of our model with respect to McCall's is that we make a distinction between two di¤erent periods: the period in which wages are paid ( t) and the period it takes the unemployed worker to draw a new wage o¤er (T ). Period t is also the period with respect to which the time-preference parameter is de…ned, and is normalized to unity. Both time periods t and T are taken as given by consumers.
By assumption, there are two states regarding the consumer's optimization problem: w and 0: State \w" corresponds to a job o¤er of w at hand, and state \0" to no job o¤er. In state w the worker can accept or turn down the o¤er. If he accepts it, by assumption he stays employed forever with that wage, leading to the present value w=(1 ): If he does not accept the o¤er he will be this period in state 0: Being in state zero the only thing he can do is wait T periods for a next job o¤er. During the T periods the worker receives no income (which can be interpreted as a negligible compensation wage). The individual is not allowed to voluntarily quit his job in order to go to the job market again.
Besides this distinction between two time frames, we add to Stokey and Lucas's version of McCall's model by: i) deriving su¢ cient conditions under which the average wage in the Markovian long-run equilibrium can be proved to be an increasing function of the time-preference parameter (this turns out to be very important in the construction of the between-group Lorenz curves and Gini coe¢ cients); ii) showing that the average wage is a decreasing function of the probability of layo¤s and; iii) deriving the associated withincohort and between-cohort Lorenz curves and Gini coe¢ cients when workers are allowed to have di¤erent time preferences according to some arbitrary measure.
The dynamics of the consumer problem is the following: At the beginning of each (unitary) period, each worker in each cohort j (or, given (1), cohort j ) can choose between two actions: accept a job o¤er or search for a new wage (w) in T periods. The job o¤ers are drawn from [0; D] according to the measure q: q is known by all workers. The worker is not allowed to borrow or to lend. His consumption c t is equal to his income w t in each period.
Consumers in cohort j maximize the expected present value of their consumption:
With v(w) stating for the value function, the recursive version of the consumer's problem is given by the maximization of:
To simplify the notation, we make
The reservation wage is the wage which makes the consumer indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting the o¤er. In this version of McCall's model, it is (uniquely) determined by the equation:
By a direct use of the implicit function theorem or, alternatively, by adding and subtracting (w w)dq by parts, it can be easily seen that
As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989) , the reservation wage w(j) divides [0; D] into two regions: the acceptance region A(j) = [ w(j); D] and the nonacceptance region A c (j) = [0; w(j)] : Since all employed workers of a certain cohort j have their wages in A(j); for any I A the proportion of wages with w 2 I will be given in the limit 3 by q(I)=q(A); and the average wage of cohort j; w A (j); by:
3 Just note that after a certain number of periods, by the convergence of the n th order sample statistics to the upper boundary of the distribution (D); all workers in each cohort will end up after a certain number of periods drawing one o¤er in their respective acceptance region. By the convergence of the empirical distribution to the underlying distribution (Glivenko-Cantelli theorem), measure q emerges naturally. Since only those o¤ers in the acceptance area are relevant for the calculation of the average wage, this must be the region where the integration is performed. Last, a normalization by the q-mass of A is necessary.
For a given measure q, the e¤ect of an increase of j on the average wage w A (j) is not trivially clear from (5), since the denominator either decreases or remains constant, but so does the integral in the numerator as well (because the integrand is nonnegative and the interval of integration is shortened). It turns out, though, that the division by q(A(j)) precisely o¤sets the fall of the measure of the interval of integration (think of the discrete case). By these means, w 0 A (j) > 0 simply because the wages averaged are higher when j (and j ) is higher. We reexamine this issue in Propositions 1 and 3 in the next Sections.
The Between-Cohort Income Distribution
The existence of di¤erent time preferences between cohorts leads to the between-cohort income inequality. The Lorenz curve plots the percentage of total income earned by the economic agents of a certain economy, when these agents are ordered from those with lower income to those with higher income.
The Gini coe¢ cient (G) is a ratio between two areas. The …rst area is the one between the the curves f (j) = j and the Lorenz curve L(j). The second area is the one between the curves f (j) = j and g(j) = 0: In all cases; j runs from 0 to 1: By integrating:
Suppose, by now, that the income of each cohort j; the Markovian longrun average wage (w A ( j )), is an increasing function of the time preference parameter j : Then, by ordering the population by j (or equivalently, by j);we are, automatically, also ordering it by income. In this case the Lorenz curve can be easily expressed as a function of j: Indeed, keeping (1) in mind, we can de…ne: a) the measure of people with time preference equal or less than j :
note that (by the hypothesis above) this is also equivalent to the measure of people with income less or equal than w A ( j ); b) the proportion of income earned by the j% poorer workers of the economy:
; c) the proportion of income earned by the j% poorer workers of the economy as a function of the population ordered by the size of its income:
given (a) and (b), this is trivially equal to:
By taking the …rst and second derivatives, with respect to j; in equation (7) we get
showing that the Lorenz curve is increasing and (when w suppose that H 1 (j) is given by (2) . Making
and using (4) we get (E is the (unconditional) expectation operator):
Given the assumption about m, time preferences j = (b j ) 1=T across the di¤erent cohorts take values in [z; 1): If (b j ) (1=T ) < z; then all workers in all cohorts will have an average wage w 2 ; since for all of them the reservation wage is greater than w 1 (this follows from (9 and (8), which imply that w( J ) = w 1 ; and from the fact that, in this case, b j > b j for all j): Under such conditions the Gini coe¢ cient is equal to zero and there is a perfect income distribution.
Assume from now the less trivial alternative 0 < z (b j ) 1=T : From (2) and (3):
This identi…cation (made through the composition of two strictly increasing functions) allows us rewriting equations (9) above with j j and j > j ; respectively, in place of b j b j and b j > b j : Note that the reservation wage can be situated below w 1 (it is trivially zero when b j = 0) or between w 1 and w 2 ; but (also trivially) it cannot exceed w 2 :
Using (5) and (10), the average wage in cohort j is given by:
Ew; j j
In this case, since income is a nondecreasing function of j (because w 2 > Ew); we can calculate the Lorenz curve integrating directly in j: The Lorenz curve reads:
From (6), upon subdivision of the region of integration into the subintervals from 0 to j and from j to 1; the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution is given by:
The calculation of equation (13) allows for four possible degrees of freedom: the discrepancy of the two wage o¤ers, measured by w 2 =w 1 ; the probability that the wage drawn from the distribution is equal to w 1 (q 1 ); the range of time preferences j allowed in the economy, [z; 1); which is measured by the parameter z; and the time between job o¤ers T. The sign of the derivatives of the Gini coe¢ cient with respect to these four parameters depends upon their magnitudes. This follows from (8) and (10) by noticing that j = (
is positive when j tends to zero and negative when j tends to one. Figure 1 explores some possibilities, regarding these parameters, in the determination of G. In all …gures the x-coordinate is q 1 : Along each row, the value of z is kept constant (0 for the …rst row, 0:75 for the second and 0:9 for the third row) and w 2 assumes the values 1:5; and 5:0, respectively, from the left to the right. Since j runs from 0 to 1; and so does T j ; the …gures can be used with T assuming any value. In all graphs one can observe that there is a value of q 1 strictly between 0 + and 1 that maximizes the Gini coe¢ cient; this value seems to increase with w 2 =w 1 :
The results displayed in Figure 1 are to be understood under the mechanism of the job search. In this example, all consumers with j > j have the same income w A = w 2 : They never accept the wage o¤er w 1 : Therefore, the reason generating the concentration of income is the fact that consumers with j j do accept w 1 when it is o¤ered, ending up with an average income Ew < w 2 : If w 1 is never drawn (q 1 = 0), or is always drawn (q 2 = 1);or if all time preference parameters are located on or above the cuto¤ point (b j )
1=T ; or if the two wage o¤ers are equal, there is no concentration of income.
The fact that came up in the example above, that less impatient workers, as measured by j ; end up with higher average wages, is proved (with = 0) in Proposition 1 below. Since w 
When j increases by w, either it still happens that w a 1 w + w w a 1 1 ; in which case the average wage remains constant, or that, for n > x > 1; w ax w + w w ax 1 w a 1 : In the last case, the average wage either increases or remains constant, due to the general fact that, given (14)
which is true by (14).
The General Model
In this section we introduce the possibility that, once employed, any worker can be laid o¤, in the beginning of each period, with a …xed and known probability : The value function now reads:
v(w 0 )dq and the reservation wage is given by:
where
Proposition 2 The reservation wage is an increasing function of the timepreference parameter j :
Proof. We want to show that:
Add and subtract
(w w)dq to the second member of (15) and use (note that dF = dq here) Z
F (w)dw to get:
Su¢ ces, therefore, showing that the term
is an increasing function of j : Note that:
Then:
The denominator is a sum of functions each one of which has a negative derivative with respect to j : The result follows trivially.
As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989) , from which we borrow the analysis below, introducing the possibility of layo¤s leads to a more interesting dynamics. Remember the sets A and A c de…ned before. The rules of the optimization by the worker de…ne a transition function P :
For an unemployed worker (w 2 A c ), the probability of having an o¤er in any borelian B [0; D] is given by q(B). A worker employed with wage w (in which case, necessarily, w 2 A) can only lose his job (with probability ) or keep the same wage next period. Therefore, with probability zero he will have a wage in a borelian B that does not contain either 0 or w: If the borelian B contains 0; but not w; or w but not zero, the transition probabilities are, respectively, and 1
: If it contains both, since these are disjoint events (because 0 = 2 A), P (w; B) = 1. We are interested in calculating the average wage (for a …xed j) of di¤erent cohorts of the economy in the long run. Therefore, for our purposes it is important to know the limiting measure of the state of the economy, particularly for sets C A (of employed workers). A worker of a cohort j, in period t + 1; is employed with wage w 2 C; if and only if he was unemployed and got a wage o¤er w 2 C or he was already employed with wage w in the beginning of period t + 1 and kept his job. Given the assumed independence of job o¤ers in each period, we can write
The determination of the long-run measure (C) = lim t!1 t (C) requires the calculation of t (A c ): Since a worker can only be unemployed in period t + 1 i¤ he was already unemployed and drew a wage o¤er in A c or was employed and lost his job, we have:
Taking limits, equation (19a) trivially implies (A c ) = =( + q(A)): Taking limits in (18) and using this result yields, for C A :
We are now ready to calculate the average wage in each cohort j of the economy. This is given by:
where w(j) follows (15). As before, it is not clear at a …rst glance if the average wage is an increasing function of the time preference parameter. We prove it below for the continuous case. Proof. Using the distribution function F and its respective density function with respect to the Lebesgue measure in R; it follows from the result above that the average wage is now given by:
Taking the derivative with respect to j :
(w w( j ))dq w is an increasing function of j : Write:
and use (17) to get:
The demonstration uses the fact that the probability of layo¤ does not depend upon the reservation wage.
Although we have used Remark 1 to prove Proposition3 (though not Proposition 1), this is not a necessary condition. Indeed, we extend Example 1 below to the case when 6 = 0 (with T = 1) and show that, once more, the long-run average wage increases with the time preference parameter.
Example 2 This example introduces a probability of layo¤ in Example 1. We take T to be equal to one (in which case j = b j = k j ). De…ne:
The reservation wage reads:
Ew; if j j ; in which case w w 1
; if j > j ; in which case w 1 < w < w 2 and the average wage:
The existence of the two average wages requires, in (22), 0 j 1, which implies
A nondecreasing average wage, as a function of j requires
which is ensured by (23).
Another possibility we want to check is if the intuition that the average wage should vary negatively with the probability of unemployment does in fact hold. The result does not follow at a …rst glance from (21). a¤ects the average wage both directly, through the term outside the integral, and indirectly, through the reservation wage. We know from (15) that, as increases, the reservation wage falls. Since F is a nondecreasing function with values no greater than one, + 1 F ( w( j )) increases and the term outside the integral decreases. The e¤ect of on the integral, though, is positive. Increasing decreases the reservation wage and, since the integrand is positive, increases the integral. The …nal result is then a combination of two e¤ects of opposite sign. Proposition 4 uses a result in the proof of Proposition 3 to show that the negative e¤ect outweighs the positive one:
The average wage is a decreasing function of the probability of unemployment .
Proof.
From the demonstration of Proposition 3, @w A @ w > 0 and therefore the …rst term of the second member above is negative. The second term is also trivially negative, as one can observe from (21).
The Within-Cohort Income Distribution
In this Section we consider the fact that, within each cohort, a cross-sectional analysis of income will …nd heterogeneous situations among consumers. Some have just been laid o¤, others have just turned down a wage o¤er, while others are employed with di¤erent wages, ranging, possibly, from the reservation wage to the wage at the top of the distribution (here, D). The calculation of the within-cohort inequality is based on the assumption that each cohort has a very large number of workers. By the result in probability theory that the empirical distribution converges almost surely to the actual distribution (Glivenko-Cantelli theorem), this allows us to use the Markovian stationary distribution as the distribution of incomes in the cohort.
The tools to measure the within-cohort income inequality are essentially the same as those presented in Section 3. Proceeding with the calculations, though, necessarily requires the speci…cation of a original measure over wage o¤ers, q: In what follows, we assume that q is given by the Lebesgue measure in 
Make:
By a second change of variable, if u = S( +1 w)+ w ; the above integral reads:
which by (6) leads to the within-cohort Gini coe¢ cient:
where w is determined by (15) by making q the Lebesgue measure in [0; 1].
Averaging the Within-Cohort Gini Across Cohorts
In order to have an idea of how the within-cohort Gini compares with the between-cohort coe¢ cient we need to average it out across all di¤erent cohorts. Pyatt (1976) (see also Yao (1999) ) has devised a methodology to make such aggregation. Roughly speaking, the within-index of each cohort is weighed by the average wage of the respective cohort and averaged out by the prevailing distribution of cohorts in the economy. We follow such a procedure in the calculations of example 3 below. Since the average wage is an increasing function of the time preference, this methodology implies that within-Gini coe¢ cient of cohorts with higher time preference will be more important for the mean across cohorts than those with lower time preferences.
No Additivity
Note that the Gini coe¢ cient is not an additive measure of income inequality. Therefore, one cannot add the between-cohort (G B ) and the withincohort (G W ) coe¢ cients in order to get a total Gini. However, as it has been shown by Pyatt (1976) , a decomposition of the type G = G B + G W + G O is possible, with G O standing for a correction due to the overlapping of incomes. G O is zero when the income of the di¤erent groups do not overlap. In our case, such overlapping clearly happens, since individuals from cohorts with higher average income (higher time-preference parameter) will sometimes be unemployed with a wage equal to zero, thereby being, temporarily, in a worse situation than other individuals from lower income cohorts.
The important point to notice, though, is that G O has been shown by Pyatt to be always nonnegative. For this reason, in example 3 below we refer to G B + G W as a lower bound (LB) to the overall Gini coe¢ cient of the economy.
Quantitative Considerations
Our next step will be devising a numerical example that can help us getting some quantitative insight into the problem. In order to do so, we consider a uniform distribution for the wage o¤ers and a Beta distribution for the time preference parameters.
Example 3
In an economy where in each period the workers face a probability of layo¤, suppose that q is characterized by a uniform distribution in [0; 1]: Using (15) we get:
By (20), the average wage reads:
Figures 2 and 3 show how the reservation wage changes as a function of the time preference and the probability of layo¤, the …rst varying between zero and one, and the second assuming the (extreme) values 0; 0:25; 0:50 and 0:75. In Figure 2 , T = 1 and, in Figure 3 , T = 6:Figures 4 and 5 repeat the same procedure regarding the average wage. The within-cohort income inequality has already been calculated when q is the [0; 1] uniform distribution and is given by (24) and (25).
We now proceed with the calculation of the between-cohort Lorenz curve L B (k); 0 k 1; and Gini coe¢ cient G B . Using (7), (26) and (27), as well as the expressions of k j ; b j and j as functions of j :
ii dj where
From which the Gini coe¢ cient is given by (6), with
In the …rst simulation below m is the measure of a Beta (114:5; 1:01) distribution function. The parameters have been chosen in order to make the The between-cohort and within-cohort Lorenz curves are shown, respectively, in Figure 6 and 7. Equally, the values of both the Gini coe¢ cients, for di¤erent values of T and theta, are shown in Table 1 below: Table 1 Within-Cohort (G W ); Between Cohort (G B ) and Lower Bound (LB) Gini Coe¢ cients as a Function of the Number of Periods to get a Job O¤er (T) and the Probability of Unemployment ( ) The remainder of this section is based on the date generated by the example above.
The E¤ect of Theta Note in Table 1 (see also Figure 6 ) that the between-cohort inequality decreases when the probability of layo¤ increases, whereas the opposite happens with the within-cohort inequality. Figures 2-5 can help us to understand the fall of the between-cohort inequality. An increase in has two e¤ects. First, it decreases the reservation wages for the di¤erent cohorts ( Figures  2 and 3) , thereby making it more likely that low wage o¤ers are taken by workers in di¤erent cohorts. Second, by being unemployed more frequently, the average wage of workers in di¤erent cohorts decreases (Figures 4 and 5) , impoverishing all workers at the same time and decreasing inequality.
The within-cohort inequality increases (see Figures 7 and 8 ) when theta increases, for, at …rst, two reasons. First, because more mass of the stationary distribution is concentrated at the point of zero income, an increasing function of (remember that the total mass of this point is equal to =( +1 w)): Second, at the same time, the range of nonzero wages increases due to the fall (when theta increases) of the reservation wage 5 .
The E¤ect of T Table 1 above shows that by increasing the time period in which new job o¤ers are taken one increases the between-cohort inequality (see Figure  6 ). Longer planning horizons magnify the (usually tiny) discrepancies of time preference among agents. This point is important when one considers between-jobs training, an activity that can demand discrete time horizons taking several years.
With respect to the (averaged) within-cohort Gini, Table 1 and Figure 9 (in which theta = 0) seem to lead to the same positive relation. However, by increasing the interval of variation of T and making theta = 10/120, as shown in Figure 10 , we conclude the positive correlation between GW and T does not necessarily hold.
A Comparison with Available Empirical Data
In our formulation of the job-search problem, being employed or not in the next period is a Bernoulli random variable. Let us call "success" the event of being laid o¤ next period. Then the number of periods till the …rst "success" occurs is a geometric random variable, with average 1= : If we de…ne the period in which wages are paid (t) as monthly, = 1=120 translates, in average, one layo¤ each ten years. For the purpose of our quantitative assessments of the problem, regarding a comparison with realworld numbers, we concentrate on this case. Regarding the time-preference parameter, we consider the Beta distribution with an yearly average of 0:9 and a compulsory time to get a new wage o¤er of six months.
Such choices lead us to the 1 by 3 submatrice (2; 2) in the 3 2 matrix of Table 1 , where one reads within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of, respectively, 0:110 and 0:018: Comparing the lower bound LB = 0:128 to the numbers mentioned in the introduction, this is around 60% of the order of magnitude of the Gini coe¢ cients of Czechoslovakia, Finland and Sweden, countries where income inequality is very low, or around 20% of that of Brazil or Gabon, countries located on the other side of the distribution of Gini coe¢ cients. As one can notice from element 3 1 in the table, though, the Gini coe¢ cients of the model increase signi…cantly when one allows for higher probabilities of unemployment.
Restrictions
Note that all the numerical results above, upon which we have studied the model, were based on two arbitrary probability distributions: a Beta distribution for the time preferences, and a uniform distribution for the wage o¤ers. Therefore, the results should be interpreted under this proviso.
Conclusions
In this paper we have built on Stokey and Lucas's (1989) version of McCall's (1970) model, in order to explore the use of a job-search model in the investigation of income inequality. The model leads to both a within-cohort income inequality, as found in empirical cross-sectional analyses of income data, and to a between-cohort income inequality, due to the fact that workers are allowed to have heterogenous time preferences.
Our analysis had as exogenous degrees of freedom the distribution of the wage o¤ers taken by the workers, the distribution of the time preference parameter among consumers, the probability of layo¤s in each period and the number of periods it takes for a new job o¤er to be drawn. In applied work, such distributions should be estimated from the available data.
From a theoretical perspective, we have adapted Stokey and Lucas'version of McCall's model by allowing the time period in which wages are paid and the time period in which new wage o¤ers are made to di¤er. We have also derived su¢ cient conditions under which the average wage which emerges from the long-run Markovian equilibrium can be proved to be a nondecreasing function of the time preference. This point is important in the construction of the between-cohort Lorenz curves. Third, we have shown how the within-cohort and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients can be calculated under di¤erent distributions of wage o¤ers and time preferences.
A quantitative idea of the problem was made available through the analysis of three examples. The …rst two examples were base on a two-point distribution for the wage o¤ers and on a uniform distribution for the time 22 preferences. The third example dealt with a uniform distribution of wage o¤ers and a Beta distribution of time preferences.
Examples 1 and 2 allowed us to have a measure of how the concentration of income tends to worsen when the disparity among the di¤erent wage o¤ers increase. We have also seen that the two-point distribution of wages allows for a wide range of the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient, depending upon the parameters of the problem.
From example 3 we have learned, regarding the within-cohort inequality, that both an increase in the rate of layo¤s or an increase in the time between job o¤ers (T) tends to increase it. Regarding the between-cohort inequality, we have learned that (in contrast to the within-cohort inequality), it tends to decrease with the increase of the probability of unemployment, and (in agreement with the within-cohort inequality) to increase with the time between job o¤ers. Besides, as one would expect, the greater the range of time preferences among economic agents, the greater the resulting long-run between-cohort inequality 6 . We have also learned that the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients that can be generated solely in terms of heterogenous-timepreferences, under an intertemporal job-search rationale, are of a very low order of magnitude.
Such considerations suggest a line for further research. A natural extension of the framework developed here is explicitly modelling the time interval T as a training period and/or by making it random. The main di¤erence with respect to the present analysis is that each time the worker would accumulate training, he would draw wages from a more favorable distribution:The determination of this new probability distribution should then take into consideration the fact that, the higher the (accumulated) training period, the higher should be the chances of drawing better wages, thereby favoring patient workers. T. P. 
